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I. INTRODUCTION
The distinguished lawyer and educator, Roscoe Pound, wrote
that "the term [profession] refers to a group... pursuing a learned
art as a common calling in the spirit of public service-no less a
public service it may incidentally be a means of livelihood."1 Today
the monetary rewards for doctoring and lawyering are anything but
incidental for most practitioners. This essay is a meditation on
money and the professions with a view to what it means to profess
in the spirit of public service.
II. SOME POSITIVES ABOUT MONEY
Money is many-faced; and I do not mean the grave and graven
images of the Washingtons, the Franklins, the Lincolns, and the
Jacksons who gaze somberly out as we handle our bills. Rather,
many-faced in that money performs variously, importantly, and
positively in our lives, and we had better, at the outset,
acknowledge that fact. How do we need thee? How do even
professionals need thee? Let me count the ways:
A.

Money Feeds

In all but the world of barter, one needs money to live. We
need it to buy our daily bread. Amateurs may do it for love. But a
professional, along side all other workers, does it for money; and it
would be a species of angelism to deny that fact. Since money
feeds, it also supplies an element of stability to the relationship of
the professional to client. For if professional services depended
entirely on love, then, of course, like love, at least at the emotional
level, they would tend to rise and fall, wax and wane. But money
supplies a bit of constancy to the relationship. Philanthropy is
flighty. Adam Smith knew this when he noted that the fellow who
can be counted on to get up at 3:00 a.m. with a sick cow either
owns it or is paid to take care of it. Norman Mailer put it similarly
when he said, the professional writer is the person who keeps at it,

1.

ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROMANTIQUITYTO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953).
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even on a bad day. Money keeps us from being hostage to
dilettantism; it steadies the attention.
B.

Money Rewards and Thus Motivates

Above and beyond the bread it supplies, money is often a
marker of worth, especially when the good being sold is not simply
a commodity but one's own skill. It certainly is no perfect marker
of worth. But even those professionals whom the marketplace
usually underpays, such as teachers and members of the clergy,
look to salary reviews within their institutions as indicators of the
value placed on their performance.
C.

Money Connects Us to the Stranger

Families, friends, and neighbors meet in enclosed spaces-in
the house, the church, and the synagogue; but the marketplace
puts us out into the open; it puts us in contact with the stranger.
From the seventeenth century forward, professionals-the doctor
and the lawyer-put out their shingles on the street. The sign
signaled that one is making available one's skill not simply to the
enclosed world of friends, relatives, and neighbors, but to the
stranger.
Money, in a sense, is ecumenical; it breaks out beyond the
boundaries of the parochial. The pressures today for free trade
express yet again the inherently expansive nature of the market. It
transcends even national boundaries as it opens out toward the
faraway, the strange.
D. Money Talks

Money also talks; whether it barks out commands or it sweettalks. Either way, it mobilizes and organizes resources and talent.
Money is not inert. Since it feeds, powerfully motivates, overcomes
barriers, and-as we say-opens doors, it is remarkably fluid; it
moves easily and moves other things easily; it lubricates and keeps
the world moving. It is dynamic, seizing on the inventive, the
novel. It also lets one adapt rapidly to change, readjusting and
reconfiguring the world.
Distinguishing different types of civil societies, Montesquieu
noted that the aspiration to honor and excellence supplies the
spring to action in an aristocratic society, whereas fear of the tyrant
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makes a despotic society tick.' Clearly, the spring to action in a
commercial society tends to be money that supplies us with the
objects of our desiring and gratifies our self-interest. So the
pictures on the face of money may be grave and engravedWashington and Lincoln-but money itself is dynamic and
protean, so much so that when we celebrate it, we can border on
the blasphemous, as we refer to the almighty dollar.
But that thought moves us toward the dark side of money, so
dark and deep, that Scripture once referred to the love of money
as the root of all evil.3 If not the root of all evil, money certainly
fertilizes the roots. While money feeds, motivates, breaks down
barriers, commands and organizes, it can also vulgarize, distract,
corrupt, distort, and exclude. It can vulgarize, distract and corrupt
professionals as they offer their services; it can distort the services
they have to offer, and it can exclude the needy from their services.
III. THE DANGERS OF MONEY
The dangers of money thrive on the complicated double
relationship of money and the marketplace to the professions.
A.

The IncreasedPowerof the Professions and the Emergence of the
Modern Marketplace

Their relationship is very intertwined, so plaited that one
might argue that the increased power of the professions in the
modem world coincides with the emergence of the modem
marketplace and with the still later emergence of the winner in the
marketplace, the modern, large scale corporation.
I see the connections as follows. Aristotle once referred
to the
good community, the polis, as a community of friends; people with
shared interests and goals. Aristotle's ideal polis was quite small,
small enough to be a community of names and to engage everyone
(well, not everyone-not women, not slaves) in civic
responsibilities.
The city remained relatively small until the
eighteenth century. This cameo scale let people relate chiefly
within the framework of family, neighbors, and friends. From the

2.
FREEDOM

3.

See BARON MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE
47, 47-52 (Samuel B. Rudolph ed., 1993).
See I Timothy 6:10.
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eighteenth century forward, the West and particularly the United
States increasingly shifted from a community of neighbors to a
4
society of strangers.
How do persons in that setting connect? Mostly, not through
shared interests, but through cash that temporarily connects people
who otherwise do not share common interests. Professionals
belong to that platoon of paid strangers who partly substitute for
the families, neighbors and friends who provided services in earlier
societies.
Aging patients now look to the physician and nurse as the
fixed stars in their lives, their children in distant cities. Disputes,
which once were resolved through the mediations of friends and
relatives and neighbors acquainted over a lifetime with the parties
to the conflict, now end up in the courts. Further, the parties to
the dispute and those who will manage the proceedings do not
know the principals in other connections, so one needs strict rules
of evidence and paper trails to reach a judgment in a particular
case. Litigation perforce flourishes in a society of strangers;
trained experts handle the proceedings and preside fatefully over
outcomes. Precisely because the doctor-patient relationship today
chiefly connects strangers linked by money and because it points
toward a desperately hoped-for favorable outcome, the relationship
is increasingly less stable and, thus today, sometimes erupts into
enmity. The patient resorts angrily to the courts which in their
own right and turn are controlled by strangers to both parties;
strangers attempt to bring closure to the disputes between
strangers with money at issue at most points.
Further, the corporation has been the winner in the modern
marketplace and thus able to command disproportionately the
talent of lawyers, accountants, and engineers who work either
directly for corporations or for those outside professional firms
that serve exclusively their wants and needs.5

4. In Dallas, where I live, the house with attached garage completes the
process. I drive home along an alley, flick the garage door opener to avoid
getting out of the car, park inside, and then flick the garage door shut and enter
the kitchen. If kids are out in front yards playing, if neighbors are out mowing, I
wouldn't know it. We live in a society of strangers, sometimes friendly strangers,
but, still strangers.
5. See generally DEREK BoK, THE COST OF TALENT (1993) (describing the
details on the flocking of professions to corporations).
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The Dual Identity of a Professional

While the professions and the marketplace (and money) are
intertwined today, the professional has a complicating second
identity. The professional has one foot in the marketplace. She is
paid for her work. That distinguishes her from the amateur. But,
at the same time, the professional has a commitment that
transcends the marketplace.
The least satisfactory way of expressing that transcendence is
to point to the aristocratic origins of the professional in the West.
"Having a profession" provided a social location in life for the
second, third, and fourth sons of aristocrats who, in a society
committed to primogeniture, could not inherit portions of the
estate that went exclusively to the eldest son, and yet who, as
children of the aristocracy, should not have to work for a living and
thus submit to the vulgarities of the marketplace.
Thus the
professions-law, civil service, the church, the military, and
medicine-provided the great families with an honorable social
location for their surplus gentlemen.
The aristocratic ethic of noblesse oblige deserves some criticism.
It smacked of the condescension of the superior toward the
inferior; it bent low with benevolence, and it operated within the
closed circle of the old boys' network.
But it also deserves some praise. It avoided the pretensions of
the more recent ethic of the self-made man or woman. It did not
suffer from the illusions of those who think of themselves as selfcreated. Instead, it acknowledged that one has largely received
what one is, a receiving that generates obligations to others.
Whereas, the marketplace runs on the dynamism of buying and
selling, the aristocratic ethic at its best acknowledged the social
lubricant of receiving and therefore giving. It inspired an ethic of
gratitude in the moral life.
Further, the aristocratic ethic encouraged some sense of
independence in relation to the client. One did not wholly
depend upon the client for one's living or for one's sense of one's
worth. One belonged, prior to all contractual relations, to the
moral traditions of the family and the law. That identity placed
some restraints upon what one was willing to do for the client in
exchange for his money.
But these very substantial positives in the aristocratic ethic
tended to fade, leaving behind only a self-serving trace of the ethic
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in guild prohibitions-until the 1970s-against advertising. A
ghost of the aristocratic origins of the professions showed up in the
complaints that:
1.

Money Vulgarizes

However, the courts, beginning with the Virginia decision in
the 1970s,6 prohibited professional guilds from banning advertising
on the grounds that such prohibitions violated monopolistic price
fixing.7 The cost of professional services had been rising much
faster than the rate of inflation. Thus the professions, while
invoking an ethic superior to the marketplace, in effect, behaved in
a fashion morally inferior to the marketplace.
The courts
understandably wanted to put a stop to this hypocrisy.
Still, rampant advertising does make one wince.
Money
vulgarizes: two root canals for the price of one until the end of the
month; Radial Keratotomy at $1250 an eye, with $500 off for the
two procedures if you make your decision before you leave our
seminar room; if you need help on your traffic ticket, just dial 9GOTCHA, credit cards accepted.
Recoiling from all this, professionals daintily hand over the
task of collecting money from patients and clients to their office
staffs so as not to brush up too close to money. But the polite
conventions of professional billing do not fool. Professional
schools increasingly require courses in business management; they
do not enroll as many students in courses on professional ethics.
Further, the recruits for the professions today hardly enter them
with aristocratic pedigree. The professions no longer serve as the
parking place for the younger sons of aristocrats, but as the social
escalator that carries sons and daughters upward from the working
and middle classes-those often without clear public identities and
without resource, who need to earn their entire living from their
profession. Thus the modern professional has both feet planted in
the marketplace. The question grows more acute. Does he or she
have any further identity that transcends the cash nexus? Is the
professional simply a combination of technician plus entrepreneur;
someone who sells a skill in the law, medicine, accounting,
6. See Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 604 F.2d 840, 843-44 (8th Cir. 1979)
(citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977)).
7. See, e.g., Hirschkop, 604 F.2d at 843-44.
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engineering, or theology? Or is the professional something more?
That is the question of double identity that lies behind the topic,
"money and the professions."
Roscoe Pound, the great jurist, answered the question by
invoking, not the aristocratic tradition, but the old religious term, a
"calling." In an oft-quoted line, he said, "The term [profession]
refers to a group... pursuing a learned art as a common calling in
the spirit of public service-no less a public service because it may
incidentally be a means of livelihood. Pursuit of the learned art in
the spirit of public service is the primary purpose." 8
Pound refers to a profession as a calling, and he links a calling
with the pursuit of the common good. The religious tradition of
the West made this connection in its Scriptures and so did the
seventeenth century Puritan, William Perkins, influential on the
American scene. He defined a calling as that to which God has
appointed us to serve the common good. 9 So conceived, all lines of
work, but especially those callings that serve goods basic to our
common life, such as law, medicine, and religion, ought to
contribute to the common good.
However, in our time the notion of a calling has tended to
deteriorate into a career. A career refers to that wherein I invest
myself, on the basis of PSAT, SAT, GRE, LSAT, and MCAT scores,
in the pursuit of my own private goals. Etymologically, a career
derives from the same root as a car. A car is an automobile,
literally, a self-driven vehicle through life, in and through which I
enter into the public thoroughfares but for the purpose of
reaching my own private destination.
But if a profession is a calling to serve a public good and not
simply a vehicle for serving my own private, careerist aims for
money and fame, we are prepared to identify a second danger and
temptation of money, more serious than the first.
2.

Money Distracts

Money distracts, as well as vulgarizes. Philosophers have
distinguished between the goods internal to a practice-such as the
arts of lawyering, healing, and preaching-and the goods external
8. POUND, supranote 1, at 5.
9. See William Perkins, William Perkins on Callings, in PURITAN POLITIcAL
IDEAS, 1558-1794 35, 36 (Edmund S. Morgan, ed. 1965).
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to a practice-such as the fame or fortune which a practice may
generate. If the careerist is a physician, lawyer, or preacher, only
for the money, she has lost that single-mindedness, that purity of
heart, which allows all else to burn away as the practice shines
through. The love of money and fame distracts; it focuses
attention elsewhere.
In Kingsley Amis' 1954 novel, Lucky im, a college history
professor answers his phone, saying, "History here."
What a
wonderful line! Better than "Historian here" or "Dr. Toynbee
here." "History here" points to the activity, pure and simple, not to
the office or to the attainment of the person. Isn't that what a
distressed patient wants when he calls the doctor about a baffling
symptom? "Healing here." Isn't that what the distressed client or
parishioner needs, when calling the lawyer or the priest?
"Sanctuary here."
Money distracts the professional from what should be his or
her single-minded professional purpose, the client's welfare. Justin
A. Stanley, past president of the ABA and chair of the ABA
Commission on Professionalism noted in the comprehensive
report of the Commission that:
[A] ny number of large law firms are now going
into business or businesses which they control or
manage ... . For example, one firm has set up one

investment advisory service, and this functions
principally, I guess, to advise clients of the law firm.
Another set up a lobbying entity in Washington,
D.C. Another firm has invested heavily in real estate
development.
Why do they do this? Well they claim to serve
their legal clients better by providing ancillary
services: sort of a one-stop shopping center. I
suspect, however, that they could do just as well for
their law clients if they introduced them to
competent financial advisors, lobbyists, or investors
in real 11 estate. I think that the real reason is
money.

10.
11.

KINGSLEYAMIS, LucKyJIM (1954).
Justin A. Stanley, Professionalism and Commercialism, 50 MONT. L. REv. 1, 9
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Money Corrupts

Eventually, a focus on the goods external to a practice can
corrupt the practice itself. The actress interested only in her
Nielsen ratings and the advertising revenue it generates repeats the
tricks that worked for her last week and at length her show
deteriorates into a series of running gags and repeated cliches,
corrupting the original good of a theatrical performance.
The specific corruption of money in the case of the
professional transaction can be stated as follows: A marketplace-as
distinct from a professional-transaction between two selfinterested and relatively knowledgeable parties engaged in the act
of buying and selling; each party attempts primarily to protect his
or her self-interest.
The seller does not feel particularly
constrained to watch out for the buyer's interests. That's up to the
buyer, who, on the basis of comparative shopping and other
means, has a way of becoming knowledgeable.
But a basic asymmetry exists in the relation of the professional
to her client. The professional possesses knowledge (and the
power that knowledge generates), while the troubled client is often
too ignorant, powerless, and anxious to watch out for himself. A
medical crisis, moreover, usually leaves little time for comparative
shopping, even if one knew how to assess the professional's skills.
Patients, students, clients, and parishioners cannot readily obey the
marketplace warning: caveat emptor-buyer beware.
Their lack of knowledge and their neediness require that the
professional exchange take place in a fiduciary setting of trust that
transcends the marketplace assumptions about two wary
bargainers. The importance of this trust should determine our
view of what the professional has to sell. In a marketplace
transaction, the salesperson does not ordinarily feel obliged to
calculate my self-interest other than its value to him in clinching a
sale. The salesman does his best to serve his self-interest and sell
me the car, the refrigerator, whatever.
When I enter the
showroom, I am a pork chop for the eating. That's part of the
game.
But if I visit a physician, I must be able to trust that he or she
sells two items, not one. First, the physician, to be sure, sells a

(1989).
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procedure. But, second, she must also offer her professional
judgment that I need the treatment she offers. The surgeon is not
simply in the business of selling hernia jobs, but also the further,
cold, detached, disinterested, unclouded judgment that I need that
wretched little procedure.
Otherwise, the physician abuses
disproportionate power and poisons the professional relationship
with distrust. Instead of sheltering, she takes advantage of the
distressed. She reduces me merely to a profit-opportunity. And, if
I find that out, I will resent her for taking advantage of me in my
powerlessness.
Herein lies the ground for all professional strictures against
conflicts of interest.
The professional must be sufficiently
distanced from his own interests and that of other clients to serve
the client's well-being.
Money does not alone tempt the professional to compromise
the interest or welfare of his or her patient or client. The lure of
fame or the interests of an institution can also undercut fidelity to
the patient. In teaching and research institutions, the physician
may be tempted to reduce the patient to teaching material or to
recruit the patient for a research protocol not entirely in the
patient's best interests. The lawyer in search of fame may find it
enticing to push the client's case down a groundbreaking path in
the law, a strategy that, however, exposes the client to greater risk.
Professional codes enjoin against such breaches in fidelity in the
pursuit of fame, tenure, or some institutional goal. However,
money, creates far and away the most numerous conflicts of
interest corroding professional responsibility.
The basic payment systems for professional services create
different temptations for professionals (and the institutions for
which they work). The fee-for-service system tempts doctorsS to12
overtreat and the prepayment system to undertreat patients.
Either way, the patient's best interests can suffer.
Traditional fee-for-service medicine, coupled with a laxly
monitoring third-party-payer system, led to the overuse of medical
services. 13 The federal government, through taxes, and insurance
companies, through charges to employer plans, eventually

12.

See

MARC

A.

RODWIN,

MEDICINE,

MONEY,

AND

MORALS:

PHYSICIANS'

CoNFLicrs OF INTEREST 56 (1993)

13.

See generally id.
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recovered their costs on whatever they paid doctors or hospitals for
treating a particular patient. 4
Doctors enjoyed economic
incentives to overtreat. A primary care internist could "increase his
or her net income by a factor of almost three by prescribing a wide
but not unreasonable set of tests." 15 Harold S. Luft observed that
the use of such tests was "so common as to be almost standard
practice; yet some clinicians would argue that few of the tests
[were] actually necessary."16 The temptation compounds inasmuch
as physicians had "a financial stake in 25 to 80% of ancillary
medical facilities depending on the region and the kind if
facility. 17 Further, a study by a consulting firm, ABT Associates,
found that, "doctors who performed and charged for their own
radiological tests prescribed such tests at least four times as often
and charged higher
fees
than did doctors who referred their
••
,18
patients to radiologists.
These various financial incentives do not
of themselves produce shoddy treatment or overtreatment, but
they load the field of practice with temptations.
Money can also corrupt the medical exchange by creating
incentives for insufficient treatment under prepayment systems.
Under a capitalization system, insurance companies, and other

14.
15.

See id. at 18.
Id. at 55 (quoting Harold S. Luft, Economic Incentives and Clinical Decisions,

in

THE NEW HEALTH CARE FOR PROFFE: DocToRs AND HOSPITALS IN A COMPETITIVE
ENVIRONMENT 110 (Bradford Gray, ed. 1983)).

16. Id. (quoting Luft, supra note 15, at 110). Under fee for service practice,
related financial incentives to physicians could either slant decisions about the
treatment of patients or increase worrisomely the number of tests and procedures
ordered. See id. at 56. Financial incentives to physicians include:
" Receiving kickbacks for referrals to hospitals, specialists, clinical
laboratories and medical suppliers;
* Earning income by referring patients to medical facilities in which
physicians themselves have invested, a practice which, in effect,
constitutes self-referral;
• Dispensing drugs and selling medical products;
• Selling medical practices to hospitals and more recently to HMOs;
" Receiving payments from hospitals in the course of being recruited
to a particular practice; and
" Receiving gifts from medical suppliers.
See id.
17. See id. at 17.
18. David E. Rosenbaum, Economic Outlaw: American Health Care, N.Y.
Oct. 26, 1993, at Al.
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institutional providers (and sometimes the physicians affiliated with
them) profit from the difference between the annual amount
received and the actual expenses incurred in the care of a patient.
This time, money tempts providers to do, not too much, but too
little. The aforementioned primary care internist, who, under fee
for service, made more money by ordering tests and procedures,
now serves as gatekeeper, with the possibility of making more
money, certainly for the system and perhaps for himself, by
holding down the patient's access to tests, procedures, medications,
specialists, or hospitalizations.
Once again, money does not
inevitably corrupt, but it sorely tempts and pressures caregivers.
Managed care firms have resorted to a number of devices to
keep up the pressure on physicians: regular report cards on the
physician's rate of ordering prescriptions, referrals to specialists,
and utilization of services; a profile comparing the doctor's
performance with that of peers; built-in financial incentives for
doctors to keep their costs low; and so-called gag rules, which
prohibit physicians from disclosing to patients alternative
treatments or additional treatments not covered by their health
care plan and which, in some cases, also hide from patients the
financial rewards physicians enjoy for keeping down costs.
Some big health insurers, operating under a capitalization
reimbursement system, initially recruited doctors into contracts
with them by paying doctors something close to "usual and
customary fees" for services. But, in the course of time, the
insurers (such as Aetna U.S. Healthcare, one of the nation's biggest
insurers) shifted the basis of payouts to physicians to "the lowest
available fees," often set by bargain rate HMOs.1 9 The California
Blue Cross, for example, cut payments to doctors from 1994 to
1998 by as much as forty to fifty percent for some procedures. °
Insurers have justified these cuts on the grounds of rising costs
(new technologies, and an aging population) unaccompanied by
rising income because employers refuse to increase their
prepayments for health care coverage. Diminishing profits for the
insurers have led them to reduce their payouts to physicians; the
rapid merger of various competing insurers have given the

19.

See Milt Freudenheim, Insurers Tighten Rules and Reduce Fees for Doctors,

N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1998, at 1.

20.

See id.
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remaining ones increased leverage over doctors to do so, since they
control the supply of patients.
Doctors found themselves facing a financial squeeze, and
other squeezes as well:
[E]ven though insurers have the final say over
whether a treatment is necessary, many contracts
now hold the doctors, not the health plans, liable in
malpractice suits over denial of care, which have
soared lately.
On top of that, doctors must
frequently give up the right to sue the health plan if
it refuses to pay for a service."
Irony abounds. For decades, doctors looked to Washington,
D.C. as the single threat to their freedom to practice as they
pleased. They celebrated the free enterprise system as their natural
ally against Washington. But the marketplace eventually yielded
corporate health care institutions, which initially offered doctors a
supply of patients at customary and usual rates of compensation.
Thus, birds flew into the cages but at length found their ration of
seed reduced, their songs scripted, and penalties in place either
way; sometimes punished if they sing according to script and
punished if they refuse to.
The legal, like the medical, profession has prohibited practices
that violate the interests of the client. It has especially enforced
prohibitions against conflicts of interest that arise when lawyers
and their firms serve two clients with conflicting interests. But the
profession has been much less scrupulous about protecting a
client's financial interests from the pecuniary interests of lawyers
themselves. Temptations multiply. Lawyers can pad billable hours,
string out a lawsuit to increase billable hours; engage in more
expensive research than necessary; expand the list of witnesses to
be interrogated; and extend discovery proceedings endlessly. The
normal controls of marketplace supply and demand have not
succeeded in regulating fees. Increases in the per capita number
of doctors and lawyers have not driven down fees; they have risen
rather than declined.
Derek Bok, in The Cost of Talent, remarked that "the most
21.

Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss1/16

14

OF CALLINGS
THE FUTURE
May: Money
and the Professions:
Medicine and Law

1999]

by
promising remedy by far . . . is more aggressive bargaining
their outside lawyers.
corporations over the fees they will pay
That remedy, of course, does not solve the problem of less
powerful and efficient clients who do not enjoy the bargaining
position of corporations. Further, some of the strategies whereby
lawyers drive up their prices-for example, protracted discovery
proceedings-perversely work. They may hike up the costs of legal
services for the opposition so high as to drive the opposing party
out of the case. In that event, the client may have gotten his
money's worth. He wins the case. But the legal system as a whole
loses. The quality of justice is strained. Contingency fee cases also
provide lawyers with opportunities to fiddle their clients.
Unsuspecting clients do not know enough about their chances of
winning, or the amount of time their case may require, to protect
their own interest in setting the percentage for a contingency fee.
As Bok wryly noted, "most plaintiffs do not know enough whether
they have a strong case, and rare is the lawyer who will inform them
(and agree to a lower percentage of the take). 2 3 A payment system
based exclusively on winning creates temptations for lawyers to
exploit their clients; even worse, it pressures lawyers to abuse
opposing parties and to tarnish the legal system as a whole-"when
lawyers get paid only if they win, the incentives to behave
unprofessionally, if that is what it takes to succeed, are very
strong.,24 When money corrupts, it leaves a trace of poison in the
whole system.
4.

Money Distorts

Money distorts, as well as corrupts, the professional
relationship. That assertion requires us to identify a second way in
which the professional exchange differs from a marketplace
transaction.
In addition to its disinterestedness, the professional exchange
should be, when circumstances require, transformational-not
merely transactional. The practitioner in the helping professions
must orient herself, not simply to the client's self-perceived wants,
but to the client's deeper needs.
22.

BOK, supra note 5, at 153.

23.
24.

Id. at 140.
Id. at 142.
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The patient suffering from insomnia often wants simply the
quick fix of a pill. But if the physician goes after the root of the
problem, she may have to help the patient transform the habits
that led, in the first instance, to the symptom of sleeplessness. The
physician is slothful if she dutifully jumps to acute care but neglects
preventive medicine.
Similarly, the effective lawyer needs to offer not simply
wizardry as a litigant in the courtroom, but effective counseling
that keeps the client out of the courtroom in the first place. That
often requires what Anthony Kronman, Dean of Yale Law School,
has called, "practical wisdom. 2' 5 The professional may need to
edge out beyond a bare marketplace transaction, in which one
simply sells the customer what he or she wants, and, rather, engage
in changing a course of action or a pattern of life. No one should
underestimate the difficulties of doing so. As J. Pierpoint Morgan
said to Mr. Root, "I don't want a lawyer to tell me what I can't do. I
want him to tell me how I can do what I want to do." The powerful
client would often turn the lawyer through money into a tool of his
will, pure and simple. The old rule that the lawyer owes her client
"zeal" plays into this deferential role. The Kutak Commission, in
its efforts at reform, argued that lawyers owe their clients
"diligence," a much more temperate term morally than zeal. In so
doing, the conscientious lawyer may need to distinguish between
what the client can get away with legally and what is wise.
Once again, the basic payment system and the flow of money
can variously pressure, distort, and repress the transformational
element in the professional exchange. Most of the incentives in
conventional fee-for-service medicine favor acute care, at the
expense of preventive, rehabilitative, long-term, and terminal care;
they favor physical, at the expense of mental health care. The
physician who hands the patient what he wants-the sleeping pillgets him out of the office faster. Her office costs for a secretary
and a nurse are roughly the same, whether she handles more or
fewer patients. The temptations are great to become an artful
people mover-to question the patient about his deeper problem
takes time. What gives with your Atlas syndrome that you cannot
let go of the world for seven hours, or with your perfectionist

25. ANTHONY T. KRONmAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 20 (1993).
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tendencies that make you lie in bed at night reliving painfully the
gaffes of the previous day or worrying about the overload of duties
that fills the morrow? The transformation of habits demands
effective counseling and teaching of the patient, and teaching is
slow boring through hard wood. The fee-for-service reward system
has undercompensated those engaged in primary care and
overcompensated those engaged in piece-work medicine. Money
distorted and skewed the medical goods delivered.
In general, a prepayment, as distinct from a fee-for-service
system helps shift the emphasis in care away from acute to
preventative medicine. Early preemptive care spares providers the
huge expense of acute interventions at a later date. Accordingly,
HMOs created financial incentives for patients to come in for
regular physical examination and, through education, to become
sophisticated about self-care. The HMOs have made progress in
improving preventative medicine. However, their efforts to save
money have not led to comparable reforms in mental health and
rehabilitative medicine. They have cut back on care of the
mentally ill and shortened hospital stays for acute care treatment
without, in some cases, investing adequately in follow-up care.
Money has skewed and distorted the elaboration and delivery
of legal services. Some areas of the law have developed recently
and rapidly, generously fertilized by money; other fields have lain
underdeveloped or have developed but tardily because their
monetary rewards were few. Lawyers flocked to and developed the
golden fields of contract law, property, and corporate law. Until
recently, the money was not there for practitioners in the fields of
family law, environmental law, and product liability.
Money, however, influenced the development of the law far
more broadly and pervasively than its ability to attract lawyers to
one field or another of practice.
As noted earlier, most
professions, but especially the legal profession, expanded in power
with the growth of our cities and the merchant class. This
coincident growth of the legal profession with commerce affected
the relative balance of power in the nineteenth century between
the several players-lawyers, judges, and legislators-who shape
and produce

26.

outcomes under the law.2 6

The expansion of

See generally MORTONJ. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,

1780-1860 140-159 (1977).
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commerce also changed the territorial boundaries (and the
significance) of the various fields of legal practice themselves, and
it profoundly redefined the conception ofjustice in which the rule
of law finds its grounding. 7
Following a long period in which merchants saw the law as the
obstacle to the changes that the burgeoning commercial classes

required, merchants between 1790 and 1820 looked to the law as
an instrument of change.28 However, to aid and abet the growth of
commerce, merchants looked not to legislators or jurors but to
29
In some
judges to bring about a hospitable legal environment.
Eager for change,
respects, that alliance seems surprising.
merchants, it would seem, would look to legislators, whose business
it is to make new law, rather than to judges whose task it is largely
to interpret and apply a huge body of received common law.
However, legislatures, acting out of populist sentiment, might too
readily throw up obstacles to commerce or enact laws too local and
parochial to encourage the spread of commerce beyond a region.
Thus, merchants looked less to volatile legislators than to the
courts to provide a uniform and predictable body of enabling
rules.3 0 Further, they appealed to the courts, especially to the
courts located in port cities to offer decisions hospitable to
31
commerce across state and national boundaries.
In the nineteenth century, the power of judges also expanded
at the expense of juries.3' The expansion of judicial power
included: (1) the designation of special cases reserved to judges
alone; (2) the setting aside ofjury verdicts harmful to commerce or
the awarding of new trials for verdicts contrary to the weight of
evidence; and (3) the restriction of juries to questions of fact,
reserving questions of the law exclusively to judges.
But the increased confidence of merchants in decisions being
issued from the courts required a profound change in the very
status of the common law tradition and the role of the judges as
custodians of the tradition 3 4 In the hands of the judges, the
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 142.
See id. at 140-59.
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common law no longer simply reflected and conserved traditional
customs and practices rooted in the natural law. Rather the
tradition, as creatively interpreted by judges, took on the character
of legislation-that which is in part newly made, not already in
35
place. The interests of merchants also led to changes in the scope
and relative importance of various fields of legal practice,
particularly contract law relative to family law."
Before the
nineteenth century, a large portion of work took place within the
family, either directly through the domestic putting out system or
indirectly through the apprenticeship system. The relationship of
the master to apprentice chiefly defined the roles and reciprocal
duties of superiors to subordinates in the workplace.
Since, the
master served as in loco parentis to the apprentice and the
apprentice assumed quasi-filial duties to the master, family law in
large part covered the workplace. s
With the full emergence of the market economy and the
factory system, contract law expanded at the expense of family
law.4 ° In the setting of the family, the very nature of the
relationship substantively defines the duties of parent to child,
child to parent. In the nineteenth century, a purely contractual,
monetary relation defines the relations of employers/employees
and sellers/customers. 41 It is the consent of parties alone-the
contract-that determines the obligations of each to the other.
Consequently, standards of procedure, rather than substantive
justice, determine the rule of law in the marketplace. The law does
not substantively rest on the very nature of the relation of father to
son, master to apprentice.
The law can look only to the
agreements into which parties enter. It can review only such
procedural questions as to whether coercion or fraud

35. See id. Much later, of course, the very success of the eventual
transformation of the legal system into a body of law hospitable to commerce led
in the twentieth century to a deep suspicion of an activist bench. Neither lawyers,
unqualifiedly committed to the adversary system, nor conservative legislators
wanted judges altering a legal system friendly to commerce which they helped
create.
36. See generally id.
37. See generally id.
38. See generally id.
39. See generally id.
40. See generally id.
41. See generally id.
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contaminated the agreement and then see to it that both parties
honor the agreement whatever its substantive content. The law
cannot go back behind the contract to pose substantive questions
as to whether the wage agreed to was a just wage, the price agreed
to was a fair price. A contract cannot be waived because an agreed
upon price is exorbitant nor can a wage agreement be thrown out
because it falls below a living wage. On the contrary, such appeals
to substantive justice would, in a market system, undermine the
rule of law; that is, they would surely disrupt the free flow of market
exchanges under the iron law of supply and demand. Further,
such traditional substantive standards lost their grounding in
natural law; they would seem merely to rationalize arbitrary,
subjective, groundless interference in an arena in which
contractual consent alone creates enforceable duties. An activist
bench would have no higher ground for intervention.
The point of this brief narrative is not nostalgia. It is simply to
show that the marketplace is not simply a sea in which the legal
profession is awash. Lawyers helped create the sea. The law is not
simply a profession whose commitment to disinterested and
transformational exchanges has weakened to the degree that
lawyers, like all other professions, also must hustle in a market
driven world of interested transactions. Lawyers have distinctively
contributed to the creation of the marketplace world by remaking
the law itself. The reduction of justice to procedural justice alone
tossed out those substantive constraints on self-interest implied by
the notion of a just wage and a just price. Employers simply
contract with employees; and the contract alone wholly defines the
employers' responsibility.
Thus, lawyers, who themselves
experienced the transformation of their lives through an
apprenticeship system that helped give them their professional
identity, have mightily helped both the employers and the society
at large shed its transformational duties.
5. Money Excludes
Further, money excludes; that is, it sets up barriers, even as it
breaks many down. Money opens doors, but usually only to those
who have it. Those who can't get into the marketplace don't get
the good. That arrangement works out acceptably enough in the
purchase of optional commodities-like a Walkman, a tie, or a
scarf. But professionals presumably generate and offer not

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss1/16

20

1999]

May: Money
and the Professions:
Medicine and Law
THE FUTURE
OF CALLINGS

optional commodities, but fundamental goods-crucial to human
security and flourishing: physicians generate the good of medicine,
crucial to life; lawyers, the good of equality before the law, crucial
to justice; the military and the police, the good of defense and
protection, crucial to security; the clergy, the good of spiritual
flourishing. Since these goods are fundamental, not optional
commodities, something has gone deeply awry when they do not
reach all. Without the good of medicine, for example, people
suffer a triple deprivation: the misery of the illness, the desperation
of no treatment, and the cruel proof on the part of the society that
they do not really belong. The untreated ill become strangers in
their own land. So even while money leaps over and seeps under
boundaries and enclaves, it also excludes.
Some defenders of current legal practice argue that we should
rely on the marketplace alone to distribute legal services through
the varying arrangements of fee-for-services, retainer fees, salaries
(for in house counsel), and contingency-fee payments. The device
of contingency fees extends legal services to the modestly fixed and
the poor because it requires no up-front money from the client.
These varied arrangements obviate the need, so the argument
goes, either for a societal commitment to a third-party-payment
system extending legal services to the poor or for a professional
commitment to pro bono publico service.
The contingency-fee system, of course, has generated criticism,
especially from doctors (and corporations) who look longingly at
Great Britain, which has altogether banned contingency fee
arrangements and indeed requires the loser to pay the lawyer's fees
for the winner in a court case.
Coming from the opposite direction, other critics of
contingency fees argue that the device does not satisfactorily solve
the need to distribute legal services widely and fairly.
Contingency fees, as a device for providing universal access to
the good of legal care, fail at five points:
1. Current law bans the resort to contingency fees in family
law (divorce and custody cases) thus leaving many people
too poor to secure legal services in these areas. Yet lifting
the ban against contingency fees in family law would
generate other problems, such as tempting lawyers to go
for more money and thus exacerbate already inflamed
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domestic disputes.
2. Current law also bans contingency fees in criminal cases.
Even without the ban, the results in such cases would not
often or appropriately convert into a schedule of
contingency payments.
3. Contingency payments do not calibrate readily with most
civil suits except for personal injury cases and thus might
tend to generate or pull complaints in that direction.
4. A contingency-reward system tends to discourage lawyers
from taking cases in which the payoff will not be large
(thus denying justice to clients whose potential recovery
for damages may be small in the lawyer's eyes but fateful
for the client) or from taking cases in which the client's
cause, from the lawyer's perspective, is not a sure thing
(thus denying to citizens recourse to the law in cases that
fall in the vast territory of the gray).
5. A contingency-fee system does not provide adequate
coverage to resourceless people who may not need a full
court press in the court room, but who simply need a
timely letter from a lawyer to get a bully to back off.
For these five reasons, one cannot expect the contingency-fee
system to meet the needs for distributive justice. One needs a
greater societal commitment to fund public interest law and a
greater professional commitment to pro bono publico work.
So much on the subject of money as it vulgarizes, distracts,
corrupts, distorts, and excludes in the medical and legal
professions. The discussion so far has concentrated largely on the
losses imposed upon clients and patients and the society at large
when the professional exchange diminishes altogether to a
commercial transaction.
What of the loss to professionals
themselves?
IV. THE SOUL OF THE PROFESSIONS

What is the good internal to the practice of medicine and law,
which professionals forfeit to the degree that they yield obsessively
to the enticements and hazards of the marketplace and
increasingly work for the modem winner in the marketplace, the
large organization?
The goods internal to the practices of doctoring and lawyering
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are the arts of doctoring and lawyering. Neither is adequately
described as an applied science.
When one interprets and
organizes either profession simply as an applied science, one loses
the soul of the activity.
A.

Medicine

The claim that medicine is an art can be advanced weakly and
provisionally or strongly and intrinsically. In its weaker form, one
claims that medicine is an art only temporarily in the sense that it is
a not-yet-perfected science. Once medicine is fully perfected as a
science, then one can straightforwardly apply the relevant general
principle of the science to the case of the particular patient which
falls wholly within the orbit of the principle. When practitioners
claim medicine as an art only provisionally, they sound rather
apologetic, as though they want simply to protect a place for
themselves and their slender store of experience in turf
increasingly occupied by scientists or by the managers of the huge
warehouses of knowledge and equipment located in tertiary care
centers. So understood, such practitioners resemble a traditional
society that struggles and defers as best it can the inevitable day of
its takeover by modernity.
In its stronger form, one claims healing as an art, not merely
provisionally but intrinsically. It is an art, and it will remain an art.
A scientist traffics in universals and therefore abstractions from the
particular. To achieve its generalization, a scientific hypothesis
must prescind from the complexity of the universe; it selects out
for description a particular set of recurrent phenomena, isolated
from all the variables in which they might be embedded, and seeks
to arrive at a generalization that covers the phenomena under
scrutiny. Science reduces water to the abstract formula of H2 0.
The poet Yeats complained, "I liked a little seaweed in my
definition of water." The artist offers not universals, but a concrete
universe-Lear's universe, Antigone's world, and Michelangelo's
Pieta.
Healing is an art because the patient to whom it is directed
does not illustrate a general scientific principle into which the
patient disappears without significant remainder. The patient is a
full-bodied person with her own history and universe, seaweed and
all. Her diabetes may, more or less, illustrate a generalization
about a particular disease. But the host cannot be tidily abstracted
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from the disease or the disease from the host.
Diagnosing the disease and discerning the person; treating the
disease and helping the person face her disease requires knowing
the patient, her habits, her world, her pressures and strains. These
are complex undertakings that surely draw on science but which
must be artfully marshaled by the physician who would heal rather
than merely treat and who would help discern, mend, and make
whole the universe which presents itself in the person of each
patient rather than prescind from that universe in order to handle
a detail that fits under an abstract generalization.
The institutional pressures today favor interpreting medicine
as a retailable, applied science. The reduction of medicine to an
applied science fits conveniently into the current corporatization of
health care. If doctoring is merely an applied science, then one
can diagnose, treat, and heal at a distance, the very considerable
distance of an 800 number, with a case manager at the other end of
the phone and with a recipe book in hand. The doctor becomes
retailer and dispenser of interventions authorized elsewhere.
But, as a psychiatrist remarked to me: every thoughtful
psychiatrist knows that the better you get to know a patient, the
more difficult it is to classify him under one of the diseases listed in
the DSM-IV. The patient does not conveniently disappear without
remainder into the scientist's universal. The doctor surely uses
science, but healing also requires practical wisdom in bringing
science artfully to bear on the patient's universe. That is what
doctoring is about.
Such doctoring takes time; whereas the name of the new art in
managed care is saving time.4 ' The art of moving people rapidly
through a system is certainly an art. Walt Disney was its twentieth
century master. Disney's theme parks are an expensive piece of
finite space with their chronic, core costs. One makes money
therefore by moving people through them efficiently and happily.
After I offered some of these remarks in the course of grand

42. As one waggish doctor put it, "Discharge patients, sicker quicker."
43. I belong to a golf club that has surely learned its lesson from Disney. The
corporation that owns and runs the club has kept trees to minimum. Why? Trees
block golf shots; trees that shed leaves, make balls hard to find; thus trees slow up
the game. Increase the trees, and golf scores would be higher, players less happy,
the playing time longer, and the course unable to support as many members and
thus yield as large profits to the owners of the club.
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rounds at a distinguished teaching hospital, my hosts reported that
the hospital had invited in as consultants just a few weeks earlier
two experts from the Disney Corporation. Learning how to hustle
people happily through a system is surely the name of a profitable
game, if not perhaps an art. We already talk somewhat inelegantly
of the commodification and the corporatization of health care;
increasingly, the end game is its Disneyfication.
B.

The Law

A parallel loss of the art occurs in the law. Dean Anthony T.
Kronman argues, in The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal
Profession, that the traditional ideal of the lawyer-statesman
required "the attainment of a wisdom that lies beyond techniquea wisdom about human beings and their tangled affairs that anU one
who wishes to provide real deliberative counsel must possess." He
holds that the virtue of practical wisdom which the lawyers needs in
respecting the particularities of a case, distinguishes the
practitioner's art from some variety of applied social science. 45
However, scientific realism (and its dominant heirs in legal
education today-the law-and-economics school and critical
realism) has supported "an ideal of legal science that is
antagonistic to the common law tradition and to the claims of
practical wisdom which that tradition has always honored."4 6 The
ideal of legal science dominates scholarship today and increasingly,
in Kronman's judgment, will dominate the classroom. 47 Kronman
writes:
There are others, of course, who think that the aim
of legal education is the cultivation of practical
wisdom. But their numbers are declining and the
authority of their position weakens year by year.
The future lies with their adversaries, with those
who want to make law teaching an adjunct of legal
48
scholarship and to define its goals in similar terms.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

KRONMAN, supranote 25, at 2.
See id. at 165-270.
Id. at 267.
See generally id.
See id. at 269.
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Kronman does not expect to see a reversal of these tendencies
as the best and the brightest of the young graduates of law schools
make their• way
41 into the large firms or into the in-house staffs of
corporations. Increases in the size of firms, the establishment of
branch offices, the intense specialization of skills, the
dehumanizing length of the workday, and the increasingly
hierarchical, rather than collegial, organization of the great firms
have combined to produce an environment in the law comparable
to that of corporate medicine. 50 The generalist disappears; the
great firms function like tertiary care health centers that bring
highly specialized information to bear in acute crisis. Relations to
clients become more distanced and episodic rather than
continuing and deep-going. Advise is technical, instrumental, and
oriented to preset goals; it cannot respond to the client's deeper
needs. Kronman writes:
Deliberative advice-advice about ends a client
ought to choose, as opposed to the means for
reaching ends already chosen-presupposes a
familiarity with the client's past and a breadth of
understanding of his or her present situation, which
the movement toward a more transactional and
specialized form of law practice has gone along way
toward destroying in the country's largest firms. As
a result, lawyers in these firms are today less often
called upon to give advice that requires real
prudence as distinct from technical knowledge. 5'
Nor can we expect judges today to preserve the tradition of
practical wisdom that the law schools and the huge firms have
largely abandoned. To mention only two major obstacles: judges
face huge caseloads today, and they have to rely increasingly on
clerks to write up their opinions in some dizzying, Disney-like effort
to keep the cases moving through the system.
In varying ways, Kronman believes, the courts, law schools, and

49.
50.
51.

See generally id.
See generally id.
See id. at 290.
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law firms today fail to encourage and sustain the art of lawyering
and the practical wisdom that its high practice requires." Nor is he
optimistic about the capacity of any of these institutions, as
currently structured, to restore that ideal."
However, his
pessimism does not lead him to silence the call to practice the
ideal; and he recognizes the possibility that in less-driven, modest,
small-scale settings for practice it may be possible to bear witness to
the ideal.54
Why then care about the ideal? Why not treat our professions
merely as a means to a livelihood? Why not go with the flow? Why
take seriously Roscoe Pound's insistence that the primary purpose
of a profession 5 is "the pursuit of [a] learned art in the spirit of

public service?"

V. CONCLUSION

This essay closes with just two reasons for insisting on the
public duties of professionals, whatever their circumstance. First,
by going to a university and eventually acquiring their professional
degrees, young people in a society like ours pass through the
gateway into the ruling class. Traditional societies transmitted
power largely on the basis of blood, their rulers inherited their
power. But we transmit power chiefly on the basis of knowledge,
largely acquired at a university. That's why parents-rich or poor,
successful or drifting-worry about whether their children will get
into good universities. Through education, the young will acquire
their power base in life; as power wielders, in effect, they will rule,
and the task of rulers, if they stick to their proper goal, is the
pursuit of the common good.56
Second, the power that professionals acquire at a university is
not a power that they have picked up on their own. No one can go
through a university and think of himself/herself simply as a solo

52. See generally id.
53. See generally id.
54. See generally id.
55. POUND, supra note 1, at 5.
56. Aristotle once noted severely that the specific corruption of the tyranny is
the wielding of public power for one's own private purposes. The modern
careerist, in pursuing exclusively his own private goals, may not engage in the
tyrant's melodramatic sins of commission, but he cumulatively and relentlessly
defects from his duties to the common good through his sins of omission.
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entrepreneur gathering up a private stockpile of knowledge to be
sold on the market to the highest bidder. No one taking a seat at a
guild meeting can think of himself or herself as a self-made man or
woman. A huge company of people have contributed to the
shaping of professionals as they zigzag their way through college
and professional schools: the janitors who clean the johns; the help
in the kitchen; the secretaries who make the operation hum; the
administrators who wrestle with the institution's problems; the
faculty who share with students what they know; the vast research
traditions of each of the disciplines that set the table for that
sharing; and the patients and clients who lay their bodies and souls
on the line, letting young professionals practice on them in the
course of perfecting their art. And behind all that, the public
moneys and the gifts that support the enterprise, so much so that
tuition money usually pays for only a fraction of the education.
When physicians and lawyers and others treat education as a
merely private asset, they systematically distort and obscure the
social origins of knowledge and therefore the power that that
knowledge places within their grasp and the end that that power
ought to serve-the nation's flourishing.
I have not come to my last sentences cavalierly to dismiss or
condemn the role of money as it feeds, motivates, energizes,
mobilizes talent, and in, part, as it distributes goods. Money is a
useful but unruly servant. We ought not let its unruliness distract
us from our commitment to what patients and clients have reason
in our common tradition to hope for: healing here; sanctuary here.
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